Analysis: India’s stance on Ukraine seems to baffle Western leaders but the answer lies in India’s history
At the G7 summit in September 2022, member states discussed plans to impose a price cap on Russian oil imports, in order to decrease Russia’s funds to fight the war in Ukraine. This would only be effective if it was followed by all the major buyers in the Market, with French finance minister Bruno Le Maire saying it should be a global initiative. When Indian Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri was asked about India’s support for the measure he was hesitant to show any commitment. In fact to this date India has refused to condemn Russia’s actions and has increased its oil imports from Russia since the war began. Many Westerners find this approach baffling. When President Biden met with Prime minister Modi, in April 2022, he insisted that buying Russian energy was not in ‘India’s interest’ and that the US and India were ‘destined to be stronger better and tighter’ being two of the world’s largest democracies. His defence secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated this point saying India must ‘stand together’ with other democracies to ‘defend the values that we all share’. In these attempts to appeal to India’s strategic and above all moral interests, Western leaders are deliberately being blindsided to what really drives India’s foreign policy. That is the treasuring of its sovereignty and India's belief in its capability to navigate the geo-political landscape as a single entity.
India is a country that for years suffered under foreign domination from Britain. Having won their independence in 1947, many Indian politicians are wary to give up any of this sovereignty viewing it as too precious to compromise and this includes foreign policy. India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru devised the policy of non-alignment so India could be an independent force in World politics and despite changes in government this approach has persevered.
This affection for geopolitical sovereignty is reflected across the entire political spectrum. Jay Panda, Vice President of the BJP, India’s ruling party and Shashi Tharoor MP for the opposition Congress party both gave interviews to the German news station DW and both expressed concerns about joining any alliance scheme. Tharoor says that an alliance ‘implies to some degree a mortgaging of your freedom to make you owns decisions’ and Panda hinted at the ‘mixed track record’ of the US’s past alliances. What India doesn’t want by joining an alliance system, is to be dragged into conflicts that aren’t in its own interests, like it has seen with other countries in regard to the long and costly campaigns in the middle east, in support of the United States. India sees its approach of non-alignment as the superior Modus Operandi in geo-politics. This view is reflected by Indian foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who believes that India’s border disputes with China have been much better handled than the situation in Ukraine.
What strengthens this affinity to non-alignment and refusal to join alliance structures is perceived Western hypocrisy in regard to appeals for moral unity between fellow democracies. The West views the war with Ukraine as a generational struggle for freedom that needs to be supported by all democracies whether neutral or aligned. India believes this framing is disingenuous, since historically India feels let down by the West due to its support for its arch geopolitical foe Pakistan. Western countries refused to share military technology or sell military equipment to India for fear of upsetting its neighbour. Indian statesmen believe the West was not there to support a fellow democracy.
So who filled this void? Russia. India has a long history of cooperation with the country. It has long been India’s largest arms supplier with 68% of Indian imported military hardware coming from Russia. Many Indians see Russia not the West as having supported them during their time of need. Having watched a lot of Indian media coverage on this topic, whenever Ukraine is brought up, we are reminded of the 1971 conflict over East Pakistan or modern day Bangladesh. The news host Palki Sharma on the WION network explains, during the conflict it was the USSR who answered India’s call for help and who blockaded India’s territorial waters from US and UK warships, attempting to intervene on behalf of Pakistan. She posits why would India give up a reliable partner for an unreliable one?
India also believes this hypocrisy extends into the West’s appeals for India to follow sanction requirements. Jaishankar believes that this is rooted in eurocentrism and ignorance. He says that India is being compelled to stop importing Russian energy whilst Europe continues to do so. Furthermore what makes this more ironic to him is that wealthy European countries can afford higher energy prices whilst his citizens can’t. A large proportion of India’s population live in far worse conditions than their European counterparts and energy is a way in which they can escape this poverty. Especially since it is being sold at discounted prices. Jaishankar says that the Indian government will always look out for the interests of its own people especially the most impoverished.
He also states that Europe wouldn’t sanction governments involved in regional conflicts outside of Europe so why should India do the same. Jaishankar states that Europe needs to come out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems and that the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.
What drives India’s stance on Ukraine is fundamentally its historic position of non-alignment, which is rooted in the need to treasure its hard won sovereignty and India’s belief that it has the capacity to make its own foreign policy. Its views of the West’s hypocrisy and ignorance serves to entrench these beliefs. As long as India preserves this stance it seems the West’s appeals for action from India will fall on deaf ears.
Russia’s population is falling by 700,000 every year and now stands at 142 million. Putin worked tirelessly to reverse this decline, only to derail his efforts by ordering an invasion of Ukraine with the enlistment of 300,000 reservists. Yet alongside Russia’s decreasing population, the Russian language is swiftly losing its influence, as the number of mother-tongue speakers abroad is in steep decline. This phenomenon is not new to us: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian speaking population was diminishing faster than that of any other language in the past 20 years. If Russian was beginning to lose its influence in the early 1990s, we are currently seeing the continuation of this phenomenon, as the Russo-Ukrainian war develops.
It is no secret that the national language feeds into a country’s identity. Since 2011 Putin has organised federal target programmes to promote Russian across the globe, aiming to counteract the growing tendency in former Soviet countries to use English as their second language. Having stated that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a ‘genuine tragedy’ for the Russian people (April 2005), Putin’s projects to develop Russian as a global language highlight his desire to reinforce ties with Russian speaking communities across the world. Russia’s ‘compatriot policy’ exemplifies Putin’s resolution to protect the interests of ethnic Russians abroad, stemming from the nationalistic concept that Russian speakers are united by their shared past, religion, and language. Indeed, Putin defends the ‘protective’ role of the Russian Federation towards international Russian-speaking minorities by masking his nationalistic and political motives in the seemingly innocuous desire to promote the Russian language and culture.
Let’s examine the circumstances leading to the rejection of Russian in the post-Soviet era. Thirty years after regaining their independence, Kazakhstan finally abandoned the Cyrillic alphabet. In many ways, Kazakhstan’s linguistic reform represents the desire to ‘shed the trappings of captivity’ (Weafer 2017). Having operated under Soviet control for 55 years, it is perhaps no surprise that Kazakhstan seeks to redefine itself and broadcast its independence. The fall of the USSR saw an acute rise in the Kazakh language which replaced Russian as the primary language of education, yet, until now, President Nazarbayev had been hesitant to officially switch the national alphabet, at the risk of worsening relations with Russia. Set to take place between 2023 and 2031, the long-awaited transition to the Latin-based alphabet is a symbolic movement away from Russian influence and embodies Kazakhstan’s endeavours to adapt to a new era and develop a stronger alliance with the West.
Likewise, there have been many disputes over the role of Russian in the Baltic states. Due to the high number of Russians that migrated to the Baltics during the Soviet period, the Russian minority comprises roughly 25% of the current Latvian population. Latvia began issuing laws to increase Latvian teaching in Russian schools in 2004, but the movement was met with huge protests of around 15,000 people who accused Riga of forcing ‘linguistic suicide’ (November 2018). In 2021, the Latvian Government successfully reinforced this rule, asking all schools to teach primarily in Latvian with few exceptions, which resulted in many Russian speaking teachers retiring early. Nevertheless, opinions have changed since the early years of governmental efforts to phase out Russian; many Russians now view the policy as a practical reform which would better integrate them into Latvian society and the labour market.
We have discussed instances of former Soviet countries phasing out the Russian language, but how has the Russian-speaking situation changed due to the Russo-Ukrainian war? In fact, the 2001 census confirms that 29% of the Ukrainian population speak Russian as a first language, which is roughly 14.3 million people. Hence, a significant portion of Ukraine, specifically the eastern and southern regions, have grown up speaking Russian, however this may be about to change. Indeed, the country has seen a rapid increase of Ukrainian language courses in the last year: although many native Russian speakers first expressed an interest in speaking Ukrainian after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the recent Russian invasion has pushed the majority to make a committed effort to speaking Ukrainian. For many, the willingness to learn Ukrainian in the eastern provinces has coincided with their alienation from the Russian identity on account of the war.
In a world where language is the foundation for national identity, the retreat of the Russian language in post-Soviet states is problematic for President Putin, as Russia hopes to regain its former influence on the global stage. Thirty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, languages such as Estonian, Latvian, Kazakh and Ukrainian are flourishing more than ever, as countries look to establish their unique identities which distinguish them from the Russian Federation. The Russo-Ukrainian war has exacerbated this phenomenon and led to the increased popularity of the Ukrainian language amongst native Russian speakers, since many have begun to feel more affinity with their Ukrainian identity in the face of a brutal war.
Giorgia Meloni’s rise to power doesn’t constitute a watershed moment but business as usual in Italy’s turbulent political culture
Giorgia Meloni in the past few weeks has been appointed as Italy’s first female Prime Minister having negotiated cabinet positions with members of her right-wing coalition. Her appointment comes a month after her party, Fratelli d’Italia became the largest group in the Italian Lower Chamber with 26% of the popular vote, which combined with her allies gives her a 37-seat majority. She joins a repertoire of right-wing parties in Europe who have swept to power in recent years. This has caused many in the media to frame the issue as a ‘rightward shift’ or a radical move away from the status quo. However, in doing so many are misunderstanding the nature of Italian politics and the key to Meloni’s success. That Meloni is just a symptom Italy’s continuing political reality, where radical allegiance shifts, and rampant distrust of the establishment are the norm. A trend which helped her get into power but will also see her demise.
Fratelli d’Italia, went from receiving 4.35% of the vote at the last election to being the largest party in the Italian Lower Chamber. Whilst many see this as strange or unusual if we look at Italy’s recent political history it becomes more comprehensible. Italy since World War 2 has had 68 governments in 76 years. Political turmoil is common. The main reason for this is Italy’s electoral culture and system. Italy suffers from a lack of major continuous establishment parties. Most parties elected to the Italian Parliament were only founded thirty or so years ago. This effect is complimented by the Italy’s electoral system where members of the Lower Chamber are mainly elected by proportional representation, meaning governments are formed of lots of small parties. This culminates in a rapid turnover rate of Prime Ministers, as even small disputes between parties can bring down the government. In this way, political maneuvering becomes the status quo not the parties themselves. Any party associated with the ruling government that collapses becomes equated with the establishment. When this happens, Italians become weary of the constant turmoil and look for new solutions where they find a plethora of new parties to replace them. This gears Italy towards populism.
Populism is a difficult term to define but Antonio Masala, a lecturer of Political Philosophy at the University of Pisa, puts it this way, paraphrasing from the Italian original, populism is the belief that there is a need to restore sovereignty back to the people which has been taken away from them in some form, in order to realise the popular will. Due to the constant instability of the Italian political system the electorate feels a disconnect between their vote and the resulting legislation in the Italian Parliament. Thus, anti-establishment politics becomes the key to election success. Parties that are classed as outsiders can gain large support very quickly. Luigi, a 72-year-old professor at the university in Pisa whom I interviewed as he was leaving the polling station, puts it well, ‘People are looking for simple solutions to complex problems’ in Italian politics.
We have seen this trend in the past, with other parties. For example, the Movimento 5 Stelle, or Five Star Movement in English, which was only founded in 2009, achieved 23.56% of the popular vote for the Lower Chamber at the 2013 election and then swept to power with 32.68% in 2018, with Five Star linked Giuseppe Conte being appointed Prime Minister. The Five Star Movement is left wing compared to Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, with the main flagship policy being a ‘citizens income’ for Italy’s poorest residents. The electorate was attracted to the novelty of Five Star, just like Fratelli d’Italia. The important factor isn’t their political policies but rather their populism, their claim to be a fresh start, a new alternative to the political chaos.
‘Traditore’ said a local Pisan nurse referring to the previous Prime Minister Mario Draghi. ‘No matter whom we vote for we always end up with the same result’, that being a government that doesn’t reflect the democratic will of the people, which Draghi came to represent with his impartial national unity coalition. Giorgia Meloni was the only political figure not to enter either into the ruling coalition led by Conte following the 2018 election or Draghi’s subsequent national unity government, unlike other parties such as Salvini’s Lega and the Five Star Movement. It is for this reason that so many Italians have placed their faith in her. She is seen as the simple solution to solve Italy’s fragile governance, as well as Italy’s rampant inflation and impending energy crisis in the face of the war in Ukraine. She was able to avoid the taint of being labelled an insider. Meanwhile Five Star and the Lega now viewed as insiders suffered and saw their vote tallies fall in the 2022 election. Five Star from 32.68% to 15.43% and the Lega from 17.35% to 8.77%.
However, populism is a double-edged sword. Masala says that populism thrives in times of crisis. The key to Meloni’s success was being an outsider figure, gaining popularity through rallying against the establishment with the backdrop of Italy’s current political and economic crisis. However, what happens when the populist becomes part of this establishment? They lose their novelty and subsequently their popularity. With economists forecasting a deep recession across Europe, a prolonged period of stagflation and high energy prices, those concerned about Meloni’s rhetoric on migrants and the LGBT community can be assured that it is likely that Meloni will suffer the same fate as her predecessors. That being, as the political and economic situation worsens in the country, the factions holding her government together will start to splinter and just like the previous 67 governments, those in her party and the electorate will look for a new face to challenge the status quo.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushes Europe’s neutral nations further away from impartial foreign policy
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was met with widespread condemnation from NATO and the European Union, who responded to Russia’s aggression with severe economic sanctions intended to weaken the Russian state’s capability to make war. In addition to this, NATO and the EU member states reaffirmed their position on collective security, with President Joe Biden assuring the US’s allies that Article 5 would be enforced in the case of a Russian attack on a NATO member. Such was this backlash to Russia’s invasion that seemingly neutral and militarily non-aligned states such as Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland took active measures in showing their opposition to Russia. Switzerland adopted the same sanctions package as the EU and most notably Sweden and Finland have both submitted applications to join NATO. This came as a surprise to many commentators and pundits who hailed this as a turning point in the history of European defense. However, when analyzing the history of these countries’ neutrality, specifically Switzerland and Finland, it becomes apparent that these measures were a long time in the making.
It is important to establish the nature of what it means to be neutral. It means that the state should not involve itself in armed or political conflicts between other countries. Switzerland can be said to be the country that most heavily adheres to this policy, having had its neutrality established at the Treaty of Paris in 1815. Switzerland refused to partake in World War One and even during World War Two, the Swiss government prevented British and American bombers from entering Swiss airspace, even going so far as to imprison British and American airmen for trespassing, until the war had finished.
Whilst Switzerland voluntarily adopted and preserved its neutrality, Finland on the other hand was coerced into neutrality by the USSR. After having initially repelled an invasion by the USSR, in the Winter War of 1939-1940, Finland by the end of the Second World War found itself at the mercy of a USSR backed by its international allies in the fight against Nazi Germany. It was forced to cede 10% of its territory and become a neutral country, which was ratified by the ‘Agreement of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ in 1948. Finland demonstrated its neutrality by refusing to accept aid from the United States through the Marshall plan and by refusing to take a side during the cold war. Although Finland survived as a liberal democracy, its foreign policy became dominated by the USSR. It was banned from joining any western military alliance and actively censored anti-Soviet Finnish media outlets and politicians.
Both countries maintained their neutrality into the 1990s which saw a rapid change in the geopolitical landscape. The USSR collapsed and the EU as it is structured today was established. Both Switzerland and Finland joined the European single market and Finland became a full member of the EU in 1995. In military terms whilst Switzerland maintained its neutral military policy, Finland freed from the influence of the USSR, became an official partner of NATO participating in missions in Iraq and Kosovo. Since the end of the cold war Finland has always kept the ‘NATO’ option open, that is the capability to decide to join NATO swiftly if needs must. It expanded its army to 280,000 soldiers with 900,000 reserves and already meets NATO’s 2% defense spending requirement. Military service is mandatory, large scale military exercises take place twice every year and civil defense shelters have the capacity to house 3.6 million civilians.
Economically speaking, in recent history both countries have not shown neutrality. Both have previously undertaken sanctions, in response to military or political conflict in other nations. In 2014, as part of the EU, Finland supported sanctions, in response to the Russian occupation of Crimea and reaffirmed its support in 2016. Switzerland implemented targeted sanctions against Russia in the same year and later even expanded their scope so that EU sanctions could not be circumvented in Swiss territory, seemingly breaking its stance on neutrality in the process.
In this way both countries have violated their supposed ‘neutral’ stance on foreign policy, both militarily and economically. So what is driving this move away from neutrality? Switzerland, although not abandoning its militarily neutral stance has slowly moved away from its neutrality economically. Switzerland is an ever-smaller cog in an increasingly globalised world and since joining the single market, Switzerland has opened itself up to influence from the EU. In an age where sanctions are used as a political weapon Switzerland has become a belligerent in the EU’s economic war on Russia. Furthermore, as Russia continues to violate international law and threaten the security of Europe it becomes ever-more difficult for Switzerland to justify its neutral stance. Fully complying with EU sanctions as of 2022 is the next logical step in Switzerland’s increasing integration with the EU’s foreign policy.
For Finland, its move away from neutrality has always been driven by the prospect of a return of Russian domination. Finland as we have seen, has spent years increasing its military capacity and integrating with the EU in order to move out of the shadow of Russian influence. It has always kept the ‘NATO option’ available and the invasion of Ukraine has given the Finish government the justification to act on this. The invasion has shown that Russia is willing and capable of launching a full-scale invasion of its neighbors. Russia’s ever-growing volatility and aggression over the past two decades has created the looming threat of a return to the years of Russian domination, making Finland’s abandonment of its neutrality and accession to NATO inevitable.
In a world where both countries near and far away from the invasion are compelled to take sides, by their economic and historical interests there seems to be no longer any room for truly neutral nations in Europe.
Alongside the removal of England’s Plan B restrictions and the ongoing scandal surrounding Boris Johnson’s booze-infused work parties during numerous lockdowns, the news in recent days has been dominated by an ages-old topic that has come back once again to haunt Western leaders: Russia, and Putin’s seemingly eternal fixation on ensuring citizens in the former Soviet Eastern European countries can’t have a moment of peace from him. The latest target of this infatuation? Ukraine, the former Soviet republic which has already seen a part of its territory detached by Russia in 2014, namely the Crimean peninsula. Russia’s military movements in the last couple of weeks, including the relocation of over 100,000 troops to near the Ukrainian border, has prompted the White House to declare that a Russian invasion is ‘imminent’ and the removal of many Western diplomats and embassy staff from the country. The only formal option that Putin has given the West to de-escalate from this standoff entails fulfilling several demands that would be politically and militarily suicidal, including the withdrawal of NATO weapons from Eastern European countries and the prohibition of Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. Yet what lies behind Putin’s maneuvers?
The situation is far more complex than the Russian leader somehow wanting to prove himself and his country against the West. Instead, the reasons are far more historically and culturally oriented. Understanding of this topic has been somewhat facilitated by the publication of a 5,000-word essay on the topic by Putin himself, where he declares himself to be ‘confident that the future of Ukraine is only possible in partnership with Russia’.
In his mind, he does not seek to subjugate a foreign country; he seeks to ensure close relations with his own people. There are multiple references to the idea that ‘Russia was robbed’ following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. His argument is that during the Soviet era, SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic, the different countries that made up the USSR) borders within the country did not matter, as all the different SSRs were ultimately ruled from Moscow. This meant that boundaries and borders could be altered for administrative ease with no cultural or political consequences. The real problems began when the SSRs gained independence between 1989 and 1991, no longer under the rule of Moscow, but still retaining their enlarged territories. Putin refers to Russians and Ukrainians being ‘one people - a single whole’ in the article, and references their shared history under states such as the Ancient Rus and Tsarist Russia, their shared language and religion as justification for saying there is no reason why they should not be, de facto, the same country. One such precedent for this could be the original plans for Union State, a political confederation between Russia and Belarus that entails free movement, Russia’s right to intervene militarily in Belarus, and initially planned for a common currency.
However, there are some big flaws in President Putin’s logic that render his attempts to coerce Ukraine into ever-closer relations with Russia unjustifiable. The last sentence in his article reads ‘And what Ukraine will be - it is up to its citizens to decide’; however, the mass movement of troops to the Ukrainian border and the issuing of lists of demands hardly seems to be emblematic of this spirit.
Putin’s argument for at least closer relations with Ukraine, if not Russian control over the whole country, rests on the past. He talks about the Ancient Rus, a federation of Slavic states that existed during the Middle Ages, and Tsarist Russia, a system that effectively supported slavery until the half-century prior to its abolition. Such emblems of the long-gone past are hardly relevant in deciding the future of a developed modern country. His constant references to the shared language, customs, and religion of Russia and many former Soviet Eastern European states adds little to his argument. It is true that the Orthodox church is the predominant religion throughout much of Eastern Europe, that Russian is spoken as a significant minority language in countries such as Ukraine, and that Eastern European languages such as Belorussian and Ukrainian share many similarities with Russian. Do these features mean Russia has an inherent right to closer relations with, or control over, these countries? Well, put it this way. Does Britain have a right to close relations or control over the United States simply by virtue of both countries speaking English, having a majority Christian population and having been the same country in the past? The answer to both questions is no, yet Putin seems to think differently.
The biggest difference between the two modern-day countries that unravels a lot of Putin’s argument are their political climate and aims. Their Democracy Index scores are telling: Russia sits at 3.81, well within the ‘authoritarian regime’ categorisation, whereas Ukraine’s score of 5.81 places it near the ‘flawed democracy’ band, a band it would likely sit in were it not for Russia’s past interferences. Ukraine’s aspirations of enhancing its democracy, joining NATO and applying to join the EU in 2024 could not be further from Putin’s goals of preserving his own rule, expanding his own sphere of influence, severely limiting Russia’s democracy, and infringing on the sovereignty of his neighbours to the south and west. His statement that ‘modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era’ is shown to be deeply flawed. Ukraine shares far fewer political traits with the Soviet Union than Russia; whilst the Soviet-era orders and concepts such as the oligarchy still feature in both countries, the former is working towards distancing itself from this past whereas the latter tends to embrace it.
Despite the reasoning that Putin voices in his article, the motivations behind Russia’s desire to control Ukraine are not solely political and cultural. It would also be militarily advantageous for Russia to control Ukraine. 95% of the country is very flat, meaning that a hypothetical military advancement into Russia by the West would not be hindered by mountains or hilly terrain. This layout facilitated the invasion of Russia in 1812 by Napoleon, during the 1853-6 Crimean War, and during both World Wars. It provided a big motivation for Stalin to retain control over Eastern Europe following the end of the Second World War. It also explains the motivation behind statements such as that of Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, who said that ‘it’s absolutely mandatory to ensure that Ukraine never, ever becomes a member of NATO’; even if the last thing on Western leaders’ minds right now is the invasion of Russia, the Russian government would fear their capability to do so in the future.
So, all this said, what will likely happen? When deciding his next actions, Putin will have to carry out a balancing act. On the one hand, Putin’s instinct will tell him to invade. His historical and cultural convictions demand that Russia does not suffer the humiliation of yet more of its neighbours falling under the West’s sphere of influence. Russia is militarily superior to Ukraine as well, having 2.9 million troops to Ukraine’s 1.1 million and a far larger array of military vehicles, tanks and planes. Putin has options regarding the manner of the invasion. Troops are massed on the Russia-Ukraine border, however a joint Russian military exercise with ally Belarus in February, whose border is only 100 miles from Kyiv, could also provide the perfect cover for an invasion.
On the other hand, his intellect will tell him that there will be dire consequences for Russia should he invade. Putin may brush off Biden’s threat of personal sanctions against him in the threat of an invasion, however he may struggle to deflect the ‘unprecedented sanctions’ promised by the West as easily. These could range from blacklisting Russian banks, ‘dollar clearing’ preventing Russian companies from trading in dollars, targeted export controls restricting the sale of key commodities to Russia, and blocking Russian access to international debt markets. They could also involve the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 gas line that goes to Germany and the booting out of Russia from the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) which regulates international banking. These measures would have a huge impact on Russia’s economy and ability to trade, and they would come on top of the impact of sanctions that were imposed in the wake of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Crimea pushed Putin’s luck; Ukraine could force it over the edge.
Only time will tell Putin’s actions. But he would be wise to also remember the time he lives in. A large majority of the Ukrainian people believe in the democratic system of government, and closer relations with the West. It is irrational to declare that present-day problems can be solved by historical reasoning and justifications. He does not live in the past, and neither do the Ukrainian people.
Throughout August 2021, it seemed as though the Taliban were rapidly taking over two things: Afghanistan, and the news. Fast forward to December, and whilst they have very much retained their hold on the former, they are not to be found anywhere in the latter. However, that is not to say that the Taliban have not been busy since taking over Kabul, the country’s capital, on August 16. The ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ was, until recently, a name associated with the turbulent period of Afghan history before the US invasion of 2001, when the Taliban controlled up to 90% of the country and fostered al-Qaeda. However, it has once again emerged as an active modern-day country, once again associated with a dire record of women’s rights, a harbourer of the illegal opium trade, a suspicious attitude towards education and free thinking, a growth in terror group activity, and a decline in the state of regional relations. Despite this, the case for replacing the current government is incredibly weak.
Several weeks after the fall of Kabul, US Senator for South Carolina Lindsay Graham stated his belief in the inevitability of US forces “going back to Afghanistan” in the future following their withdrawal after twenty years of operations there. Whilst it is not a commonly held view at the moment, it is nonetheless one that should be refuted. The best thing other nations, particularly Western nations, can do right now is to provide examples of well-functioning, rights-respecting democracies. If the last 20 years in the MENA region has proven anything, it is that external attempts to impose laws, ideologies and systems of government on a country have a very low chance of working. Interventions by the West in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria have yielded few results, with all four being classed as ‘authoritarian regimes’ by The Economist’s Democracy Index in 2020. By contrast, western military intervention has only served to increase resentment towards its governments and its peoples, and has smeared its core ideals of democracy, the rule of law and individual rights. Therefore, tempting as it may seem when an image of a homeless 6-year old boy or a young girl kicked out of education by the Taliban appears on television, advocating military intervention once more is a naïve path to walk down.
Undoubtedly, the Taliban government has been disastrous for Afghanistan; by almost all measures of effective and representative government, it scores incredibly low. Whilst the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - the official name for the internationally-supported government that ruled the country between 2004 and 2021 - was deeply flawed, it can at least be said to have been working towards the institution of democracy. After just four months of Taliban rule, the impact on women’s rights, for instance, is clear to see. Whilst women can still go out and do shopping, those who worked for universities, NGOs, newspapers or in government can no longer do so, and girls are prevented from going to school. 60 of the country’s 69 female MPs fled the country as the Taliban engulfed more and more regions, while the other 9 who didn’t remain in hiding and fear for their lives in the face of ever-growing Taliban radicalisation.
The Taliban’s impact on life in Afghanistan is not limited to its consequences for women. Production of opium, the raw material used to make prescription drugs and heroin, has increased since August 2021, despite the Taliban assuring the world that they would crack down on the trade. They have little incentive to do so, given that opium accounts for around one-tenth of Afghanistan’s economic output and the industry employs 590,000 Afghans. It is a lucrative market, as 80% of opium produced globally comes from Afghanistan. In this case, sheer ideological conviction is not sufficient reason for the Taliban for a crackdown. Their promise that in Afghanistan “nobody can be involved in drug smuggling” rings as hollow as their pledge to respect media freedom and human rights.
More general economic issues are endemic under the Taliban. US-led sanctions have harmed the country, freezing almost $10bn of Afghanistan’s assets in August. This caused a banking crisis that led to queues outside many banks in the country, and the Taliban imposing a $200 weekly withdrawal limit on all customers. Further, many Afghan businessmen have fled the country, and are currently waiting in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to see what action the Taliban take to enact their ‘business-friendly’ messaging. The IMF predicts that formal business will shrink by 30% in the next few months, and concrete business-friendly policies are in short supply in Afghanistan at the moment - alongside many staple goods and fundamental supplies.
Indeed, an article in The Economist from November indiciates the extremely worrying humanitarian situation in the country; 23m Afghans out of a population of 38m face acute hunger, a number that has already increased by 3m since earlier this year and will undoubtedly be exacerbated by Taliban governance. This includes 3m malnourished children, with reports of 11 year olds weighing just 13kg. However, Afghanistan’s dire situation is not solely down to the Taliban. Afghanistan’s economy has not had firm foundations in a long time, with three-quarters of government spending under the Islamic Republic prior to 2021 coming from foreign aid. Half the country was already living on less than $1.90 per day before the takeover, and UN estimates that this will increase to 97% by the summer of next year are principally down to the denial of funds the Taliban government faces from abroad.
The previous government had access to such funds despite the extensive corruption that existed at its every level; from the New Kabul Bank scandal in 2010 to it being ranked the 165th worst country in the world for corruption out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index, the evidence was clear. It would be undesirable to try and reimpose such a notorious government on Afghanistan, and the Taliban are currently the only viable alternative. Issues such as the lack of pay for civil servants and the mass unemployment of former policemen and soldiers could be helped, if not solved, by some international assistance to the government.
However chaotic and poorly-governed Afghanistan may seem, international military intervention would do nothing to remedy the situation. The takeover has led to multiple changes in the country’s political situation with regards to regional and international relations. When the Taliban ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, the Islamic Emirate received limited recognition from a small minority of the world’s countries, notably neighbouring Pakistan who was the strongest diplomatic ally of the country until 9/11 and the fall of the first Taliban regime. Whilst as of yet the Emirate has not received official recognition from any other country, it appears likely that such a formality will soon be granted by old allies. Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan described the Taliban takeover as having “broken the shackles of slavery” for the Afghan people, whilst the Saudi embassy in Kabul reopened on November 30. The United States’ old enemies Russia and China have also shown favourable attitudes towards the new government, with the former removing the Taliban from its list of banned organisations in October and the latter hoping for “friendship and cooperation” with the new authorities. Regional power Iran is willing to tolerate the Taliban despite ideological differences and reported border clashes; in the words of a former Iranian diplomat, “Iran is worried that if it does not tolerate the Taliban's undiplomatic behaviour, Afghanistan will fall into the hands of Iran's enemies”.
There is little appetite for replacing the Taliban regime once again. Multiple regional and international powers stand in the way, and throughout the West citizens and politicians alike have grown tired of the drain on time, money and resources that Afghanistan has turned into. The understandable consensus is that it is better left to soft power institutions, such as the United Nations, negotiations and donor funds, to make change. It is potent to remember the reason the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in the first place; to get rid of the threat of al-Qaeda. There are some indiciations that al-Qaeda has been growing again slightly since August and the Taliban are unlikely to follow through on their pledge to entirely separate from the group; however, this does not necessarily presuppose an immediate increased risk of international terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Further, there has been no intelligence of a spike in attacks being planned on the West from inside Afghanistan. Whatever the Taliban is doing in Afghanistan and however shocking its economic figures look, poor government has never been - including in 2001 - the reason for invading another country, and offers little legitimacy in the world of today.
On October 21st and 22nd, the European Union (EU) held a summit spanning Saturday and Sunday in the Council of Europe’s imposing buildings with a list of preselected topics that were widely expected to be discussed. However, there was a notable additional topic present that has been a thorn in the EU’s side for several years now; Poland’s increasing reluctance to abide by certain EU conventions and institutions. It has exposed weaknesses in the EU’s capabilities to enforce its laws and practises on member states, and suggests that trusting in democratic systems and respecting national sovereignty would be the best way for the EU to avoid discussing more such ‘additional topics’ at future summits.
The latest quarrel that the EU had with Poland surrounds the ruling of the highest court in Poland, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, on October 7th. The Tribunal declared incompatible with the Polish Constitution Article 1 and Article 19 of the Treaty of the European Union, referring respectively to the concept of “ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe” and “the interpretation and application of the treaties” of the EU. This stands in contrast to what many would consider to be a core principle of the EU; that EU law has primacy over national legislation. In the words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the ruling constitutes a “direct challenge to the unity of the European legal order”. To increase the controversy further, the original challenge in the Tribunal was brought by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, the first time that a leader of an EU member state has questioned an EU Treaty in a national court.
The principle of the primacy of EU law over domestic legislation has curious origins. Such a principle was not, as might be expected, contained in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the European Economic Commission (EEC). Instead, in a manner remarkably similar to the 1803 US Supreme Court case Marbury v Madison, where the Court gave itself the power of judicial review, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) largely instated the principle of the primacy of EU law itself. In the 1964 case of Costa v ENEL, a seemingly unwinnable case against the Italian government’s nationalisation of electricity companies in the Italian Constitutional Court, found itself in the ECJ over claims that the law impacted the viability of the EEC’s single market.
In the landmark decision that followed, the ECJ asserted - amongst other things - that the Community legal order had become an “integral part” of national legal systems, that domestic courts were “bound to apply” Community norms and that it was “impossible” for member states’ organs to accord precedence to domestic measures over Community law, as that would jeopardise the “legal basis” and the very “character” of the EEC. This watershed ruling was then upheld by EU member states, and by the time Poland joined in 2004, it would have been well aware of the 40-year-old convention.
The political circumstances in Poland surrounding the Tribunal’s ruling against this convention are far from transparent. The Tribunal ruling was issued by a panel of judges appointed in a murky manner by PiS (Law and Order). The same Tribunal - with politically unbiased judges - had previously declared Articles 1 and 19 of the Treaty to be compatible with the Polish Constitution in a 2005 ruling. However, from a legal point of view, the primacy of EU law was one which member states ever explicitly signed up to in a treaty or conference, and therefore following the principle was never made a condition of entry to the EU. Indeed, Poland is far from the first country to challenge EU law and institutions. The UK had a long-running dispute with the EU and the ECHR over its refusal to grant prisoner voting rights, and the German Constitutional Court questioned the legality of the EU’s Covid-response orientated quantitative easing programme. According to a study by researcher Olof Larsson, there are at least ten major cases of member states changing EU law either through changing the founding treaties or through EU directives, many of which have helped the EU to evolve.
Tensions between Poland and the EU have greatly increased since the start of 2020. The EU has protested against a February 2020 judiciary law that prevents Polish judges from referring matters to the ECJ, established a Disciplinary Chamber containing many open PiS supporters with powers to oversee Polish Supreme Court judges, and created a national body to rule on Polish judges’ independence. In July 2021 the ECJ ordered the Polish government to suspend the Disciplinary Chamber, and on October 27th it ordered Poland to pay €1m for every day it did not suspend the Chamber. The EU has also objected to a Tribunal ruling on abortion from October 2020 which declared a Polish law authorising abortions for malformed foetuses unconstitutional, and made Poland one of the most restrictive countries on abortion in the Western world. Without doubt, both laws have debatable consequences for key features in a democracy, such as judicial independence and individual rights.
Nonetheless, overreach by the EU and its organs in the past - perceived or real - has only held detrimental consequences for itself, recently manifested by the Brexit vote of 2016 and the rise of anti-EU populism in 2016-7. The EU should see its problem as with PiS, not with the Republic of Poland, as it is highly unlikely that Poland will leave the EU. There is no motivation on either Poland’s side to leave the EU, nor on the EU’s side to kick Poland out, not least due to a lack of will to do the former and a lack of will and mechanism to do the latter. The Polish government needs EU money to fulfil expensive schemes before the fast-approaching 2023 parliamentary elections. Civic Platform, a pro-EU party with experience of governing, may well win. The Polish people’s patience with PiS is fast waning; mass protests are increasingly common, and a poll conducted shortly before the ECJ’s October 27th ruling stated that 73.3% of Poles wanted their government to either back down or compromise with the EU. Whilst conducted in a shady manner by PiS, Poland does have legal grounding for its Tribunal’s ruling. However well intentioned the ECJ’s actions against Poland might be, the EU would do best to let Poland battle this out internally.
Current Affairs Editor
The 26 September 2021 has been a crucially important day for Germany, but also for Europe. The election held on that day did not only have the role of deciding the political succession to Angela Merkel in the Kanzleramt (Chancellery) after 17 years of "Mutti" leading the nation. While its full outcomes are not yet entirely decided, this election will also have a lasting impact on the international political scene.
Indeed, the election results have provided no clear-cut outcome, which makes prognoses for the future difficult. While the formerly ruling party, the CDU/CSU has come second behind the socialist party SPD by less than two percentage points, the SPD is in no position to dictate what will happen when it comes to forming a government. In fact, the German political tradition of coalitions has placed the ball in the smaller parties’ court.
In the race for the chancellorship, the Green party (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) initially did very well, and their candidate Annalena Baerbock was at times even ahead of Armin Laschet, the candidate of the CDU, and Olaf Scholz, candidate of the SPD. However, in the months running up to the election, the Greens lost a considerable number of percentage points, and thus reached 14.75 % on 26 September. Next to the Greens, the neoliberal party FDP also managed to position itself as a key player in the ongoing coalition negotiations.
In coalition scenarios, a leftist alliance between the Green Party, the SPD and the Left Party (Die Linke) was quickly ruled out. The two most viable options were thus so-called “flag” coalitions, named after national flags for their colours. A “Jamaica” coalition would involve the CDU (black), the FDP (yellow) and the Greens. However, this plan was officially abandoned on 6 October 2021, and the “Senegal” or “traffic light” coalition of SPD (red), Greens and the FDP has become most likely. It would be the first of its kind in German history.
Whatever the outcomes of this election will eventually be once a government is formed – which will still take time –, it is however clear that this could have wide-reaching consequences. Germany, next to France, is still one of the main driving forces of the European Union. As France also faces upcoming presidential elections in 2022, the potential leadership changes in both countries could profoundly impact the EU. At a time when Europe is searching for a place between the growing Sino-American rivalry and the equally growing political ambitions from Russia, these elections and their results could potentially destabilise European efforts to assert themselves - or strengthen them.
The situation will thus have to be especially closely monitored through the lense of foreign policy. Under Merkel, Germany has overall been fairly quiet on the international scene and has shied away from many engagements and open alliances, often positioning itself in the role of a mediator. This was for instance the case when the Syrian Civil War started, as Germany repeatedly stressed a diplomatic resolution over a joint European military intervention. Germany only agreed to military measures that were ultimately never taken when it became known that the Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad was using lethal sarine gas against his own people. Likewise, Germany is a mediator in the peace efforts to resolve the war between Ukraine and Russia, sparked in 2014, and continues to do so despite the increasing Russo-European tensions over the last years.
Decisions like these have also had an impact on overall foreign policy and perception of the EU by the global community; the EU’s dependence, in particular in a military context, on the US has also played a role. And as China has become increasingly aggressive in its foreign and economic policy over the last decade, the EU has not decided on a joint strategy on how to navigate the clear opposition between China and the US, nor its own relation to China. While the US is heading into the direction of a conflict with China, Europe has important economic relations with Beijing and a slightly less hostile relationship to consider. These exterior problems highlight the EU’s internal divisions, as even Germany and France as leading forces often steer in different directions. Under Macron, France continues to campaign for more European autonomy, both in an economic and a military context, while Germany has usually urged for caution. Berlin's approach to foreign policy could now be changed under the new coalition, although there remains the problem of how cooperative the three different parties will be, as their political ideas sometimes differ to quite some extent. The effectiveness of this historic coalition will therefore only become apparent after some time.
Whatever government Germany will officially be led by for the next four years, the tensions and looming threats on the international scene will arguably create a challenge for Germany - and, by extension, for Europe and its relation to the world.
The storming of the Capitol has provoked the wrong questions.
Where everyone’s eyes are right now is understandable. After the US Capitol building was stormed on Wednesday the 6th of January 2021, general panic filled the media, rightfully so to a degree. Currently the focus is on how Trump provoked the violent protest, why the Capitol Police failed to prepare for what everyone expected, and the individual recounts of the events by Capitol staff, reporters and members of congress.
There are important questions to be asked about these issues, but we must see past them if we are to truly understand what is going on. Whilst Trump’s words did directly translate into violence, he is a symptom of a more deep-rooted illness. Democratic Representative Jim Himes from Connecticut hopes that this is the peak of the troubled phase of the American democracy, and that this is the worst it will become. But to think that the election of Joe Biden fixes anything is to be either naïve, or wilfully blind.
Twenty-first century politics in the West seems to be the story of populist narratives exploiting what appears to be a deeply insecure society.
In America the obvious place to start is the socio-economic conditions. Social mobility has decreased over time in the US (the lowest out of the industrialised nations), but perceptions of social mobility tend to be optimistic whilst the American Dream is held onto.
Income inequality has experienced a steady rise since the 1980s but attempts at addressing the blatant neo-liberal undermining of the social fabric are dismissed as a Marxist plot. The country’s symbolic dedication to the capitalistic land of the free, where the American Dream is possible for all, holds it back.
An aspect of American society which cannot be ignored are the racial tensions. Not long ago we all watched daily updates on violent clashes between police and Black Lives Matter protestors. The reports of Capitol Police removing barricades to allow protestors to pass and taking selfies with pro-Trump protestors paints a stark contrast between law enforcement’s responses to the two protests.
Trump does not exist in a vacuum and whilst he should be held responsible for violence his words caused, we should not pretend Trump entered a perfectly stable political environment and suddenly created division.
Political violence always has an underlying cause. People do not simply leave their homes and risk their lives and safety for no reason. Whilst it is easy to dismiss radicals as fanatics, the truth is something radicalised them, whether it be Trump supporters in the US, Brexit supporters in the UK, Orban supporters in Hungary or PiS supporters in Poland, they have turned to political extremities for a reason, typically anger; anger which has been hijacked for political purposes.
If we dismiss the storming of the Capitol building as a violent culmination to four years of absurdity, which can be locked away and forgotten because Joe Biden will save us from our perils, we fail to understand the historical trends which brought us here.
Populism works best when underlying trends in society have angered people, and if we fail to acknowledge the societal patterns which enabled the violence then we will see more of it in the future.
In 2020, the world has not only seen the emergence of a virus that would plunge it into chaos and the biggest health crisis of the new millennium; this year has also witnessed the emergence of a number of military conflicts across the globe, not all of them new, but some aggravated by the crises of this time.
After the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which concluded on 10 November, on 4 November 2020 it became known that an armed conflict had ensued in the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia. Following Ethiopian elections in 2018, the TPLF, the Tigray People´s Liberation Front, a militarily and politically significant autonomous movement, has repeatedly defied orders from the new government and commenced regional election processes in Tigray in September 2020, once again in defiance of the federal government. Barely two months later, these political tensions have resulted in an armed conflict that seems far from being resolved.
The conflict that has ensued in the region follows a pattern that is not new: a region that is already leaning towards autonomy, ethnic and political tensions resulting in unrest and armed uprisings, military retaliation from the government. But foremost, it is a conflict that is not supposed to exist, at least not in the eyes of the Ethiopian government, who are trying their best to distract, deny and silence any diffusion of news on the events in the north of the country. International press has nevertheless made an effort to report on the conflict, especially so since human rights groups have identified at least one large-scale massacre to have taken place according to the United Nations. The Ethiopian attempts of covering up the events in Tigray merely confirm that this conflict is marked by military brutality and severe violations of human rights.
Aside from the internal turmoil of the country, what do these events however mean for the wider region and the neighbouring nations? Ethiopia situates itself in a zone in the east of the African continent, which, until now, would not have been regarded as unstable as other parts such as Mali; however, the conflict in Tigray brings instability to a region that has South Sudan – since its split from Sudan still a zone of ongoing conflict and violence – and Somalia, a country shaken by famine, Islamist terrorism and pirate attacks on its coasts.
And then, there is also the problem of refugees: naturally, as in any unstable region, many choose to flee from the violence that is being unleashed during the clashes between independent forces and the military controlled by the government. It is estimated that about one million out of the six million inhabitants of the Tigray region have already become refugees. Aside from the disastrous effects these movements of migration will have in the time of a pandemic, the neighbouring countries, notably Eritrea, whence already refugees regularly try to reach Europe, have to take in those who flee from Tigray. From a humanitarian point of view, the situation is thus already catastrophic; lack of medical care, food, communication, and almost everything else will make this conflict far more costly in terms of civilian losses and regional destabilization than any political victories could justify.
Read our past articles